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ABSTRACT
While Demand Response (DR) has been focused on large
and industrial consumers, pervasive implementation (by in-
cluding residential consumers) is needed to maximize its po-
tential. This paper presents analyses from the economics
perspective of pervasive, incentive-based DR, and consider
cases whether (1) DR is used to encourage consumers to de-
crease or increase their demand, and (2) utility companies
have access to a single or multiple energy sources. We de-
rive the necessary conditions and the optimal incentives to
benefit from DR events.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
G.0 [Mathematics of Computing]: General; I.2.8 [Artificial
Intelligence]: Problem Solving, Control Methods, and Search—
Control theory ; H.4.2 [Information Systems Applica-
tions]: Types of Systems—Decision support
Keywords
demand response, smart grid, electricity market, incentive-
based demand response, net benefit analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
The ever-growing energy demand, increasing penetration of
electric vehicles, and integration of renewable energy sources
raise important challenges to electricity grids in matching
supply and demand. To this end, demand response (DR)
emerges as one of the cheapest, greenest, and sustainable
solutions. DR is defined as changes in electric usage by end-
use consumers from their normal consumption patterns in
response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or
to incentive payments.
While there are two types of DR, i.e., price- and incentive-
based [3, 4, 14], this paper focuses on incentive-based DR,
where under flat-rate price, consumers are offered some in-
centives to change their energy consumption. The incentives
can be, for example, movie tickets, bill rebates, redeemable
vouchers, or virtual currencies which can be converted into
real products or other benefits (as in the concept of miles in
airline marketing). In addition, the messages sent to com-
municate upcoming DR events can also be seen as a trigger
as to when to act [16]. From consumer psychological point
of view, incentive-based DR also provides a positive impres-
sion. While in price-based DR consumers suffer from price
increase, in incentive-based DR consumers enjoy incentive
offers. More specifically, in price-based DR, cheaper price
periods are considered as normal time, whereas more ex-
pensive, peak price periods considered as DR events. On the
other hand, incentive-based DR uses flat-rate price, where
periods with no incentive offer is considered as normal time,
and periods with incentive offers considered as DR events.
Additionally, DR has been focused on large, industrial con-
sumers. To maximize its potential, however, DR implemen-
tation needs to be pervasive by attracting residential con-
sumers as well. To this end, the vision of smart grids and
deployment of smart meters has provided a wide-open op-
portunity to include their participation. Consequently, a
deep insights about pervasive DR is necessary. For exam-
ple, what are the necessary conditions to benefit from DR?
How much incentives should be given to consumers?
However, this task is very challenging due to at least three
reasons. First, utility companies acquire their energy sup-
ply from various sources. Some of them buy energy from the
market, some own coal power plant, some use natural gas
(or other sources), and some own several generators powered
by different sources, which contribute differently to their
profit. Second, DR can be used not only to induce lower
energy consumption, but also to encourage higher consump-
tion, especially when there is an energy surplus in the grid.
This surplus can happen, for example, when the sun shines
(for area with high penetration of solar power) or when the
wind blows strongly (for area with high penetration of wind
power) but the demand is low. Third, there are a lot of un-
certainties in consumer responses, since they are influenced
by numerous factors, such as the incentives, time of day,
day of the week, outdoor temperature, weather, holidays, or
guests at home.
Overview of Contributions. This paper provides eco-
nomical analyses of pervasive, incentive-based DR. Our anal-
ysis focuses more on the commodity subsystem rather than
the physical subsystem.1 We consider cases where DR is
used as a mechanism to reduce and increase energy con-
sumption. We determine the lower bound of the generation
cost and consumer reduction (or increase) rate2 such that
DR is still beneficial. While a common belief states that“DR
is best to be carried out when the market price is greater
than the retail price,” there is more to it than that. Con-
sumers willingness to accept should be taken into account
as well. Additionally, we derive the optimal incentives to
maximize gains from DR events. We present our analyses
in cases where utility companies have access to both, single
and multiple energy sources.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we present a brief review of the literature. In Section 3,
we introduce our key assumptions. We analyze when perva-
sive DR is used to reduce energy demand in Section 4, and
when it is used to increase energy demand in Section 5. We
conclude our work in Section 6.
2. RELATEDWORK
Albadi and El-Saadany provided a good overview of Demand
Response [3, 4]. In addition, The U.S. Department of En-
ergy and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission outlined
the benefit of DR and its relation to the electricity mar-
ket [14, 33]. In contrast to our work, Borenstein and Holland
analyzed the economics of real-time pricing (RTP) [7]. In
particular, they assessed the market efficiency where both,
RTP and flat-pricing scheme, coexist in the consumer base.
They showed that increasing the number of consumers who
adopt RTP scheme might harm the other consumers who are
already on RTP, but could bring advantage to consumers
who (stay) in the flat-rate. Joskow and Tirole also ana-
lyzed the efficiency of RTP, assuming different types of con-
sumers: price-sensitive consumers with real-time (or smart-
) meters, price-insensitive and partially-sensitive consumers
with real-time meters, and price-insensitive consumers with
traditional meters (whose meters are read, for example, only
once a month) [23]. While the energy consumption of price-
insensitive consumers with smart meters can be charged ac-
cording to the real-time price, the energy consumption of
consumers with traditional meters cannot. Since the energy
bill of consumers with traditional meters is calculated based
on the average energy price, thus they are not exposed to
price fluctuation in the market. Consequently, in case of
price-insensitive consumers, efficient pricing could still exist
only if the consumers are equipped with smart meters.
There are also a number of studies which aim to foster the
emergence of pervasive DR. However, most of them focused
on price-based mechanisms [8, 26, 36, 29, 30, 34, 35]. These
mechanisms require consumers to tirelessly track price fluc-
tuation and adjust their consumption schedule accordingly
to maximize their benefit (achieving electricity bill as low
as possible with least inconvenience). To this end, some
studies propose to use software agents (or energy manage-
1See the difference between commodity and physical subsys-
tem in [25], Section 3.2. In the future, it would be possible to
extend our work by considering constraints from the physical
subsystem.
2It indicates how sensitive a consumer is to incentives (see
also Section 3.2). The higher the consumer reduction (or
increase) rate, the more sensitive she is.
ment systems), for automatic price monitoring and schedule
optimization, to make the entire process seamless from the
consumers’ perspective [36, 29, 30, 34, 35]. Holland and
Mansur studied the environmental impact of implementing
RTP throughout the United States [21]. They found that, in
contrary to public belief, real-time pricing does not always
reduce pollution. Pollutant reduction strongly depends on
the type of generators used to meet peak demand.
While we focus on a more holistic view of incentive-based
DR, there are also some studies dedicated to consumer base-
line. In incentive-based DR, consumer baseline (or DR base-
line) is an estimate of what consumers would have consumed
in the absence of a DR event. It also plays an important role
to determine the amount of incentives that consumers should
receive [32]. Analyses of consumer baseline applied to large
and commercial consumers have been discussed in [10, 9,
1, 2, 28], while its application to residential consumers has
been discussed in [37].
3. KEY ASSUMPTIONS
3.1 Load Generation
Let us assume that a utility company has access to a set
of generators or energy sources G. For a particular time
period, let:
• Lgi be the load assigned to generator gi ∈ G, and
L =
∑
gi∈G Lgi ,
• cap(gi) be the capacity of generator gi, and
• Cgi(L′) be the total cost of meeting load demand L′
using generator gi.
To meet the load demand L, a utility company assign L
to one or more generators3 depending on the capacity and
generation cost. We assume that the utility company assigns
(or, the market implicitly assigns) the load to the cheapest
generator first, up to its capacity, before using the more
expensive generators. Thus, for simplicity, we assume that
the set of generators G is ordered by its generation cost,
i.e., Cgi(L
′) ≤ Cgj (L′) for i ≤ j. Thus, for j = i + 1, we
have Lgj > 0 iff Lgi = cap(gi) and L >
∑
1≤k≤i
Lgk . We
also assume that there are no temporal constraints (such as
generator ramp constraints and start-up constraints) and no
appropriate energy storage solutions available to the utility
company.
3.2 Consumer Responses
One of the main challenges faced by utility companies to
carry out DR events for residential consumers is that only
little is known about how consumers will respond to them.
Consumer responses can be affected by many factors, such
as the amount of incentives, time of the day, day of the week,
weather, outdoor temperature, holidays, or guests at home.
Understanding the influence of these factors requires real
implementation. Utility companies, however, need to have
a deep understanding and holistic view about DR before
3We use the terms energy sources and generators inter-
changeably.
starting any real implementation. Hence, we have a chicken
and egg problem.
In this paper, inspired by prior research on consumer re-
sponse to dynamic pricing, which confirmed that consumer
energy reduction increases as the electricity prices increases [12],
we assume that consumer responses are affected by the amount
of incentives while other factors are held constant. More
specifically, we model consumer responses to grow linearly
with the incentives. As we will also show later, this allows
us to understand the economics of DR, to benefit from it,
while keeping things as simple as possible. For simplicity,
below we specify consumer response as demand reduction
(see Section 5 for consumer response in the context of DR to
increase demand). Let {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be the set of factors
that (possibly) influence consumer responses, and x1 = I be
the incentives (unit: $).4 We define the consumer response
(or the demand reduction) during a DR event as:
r(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = r(I, x2, . . . , xn) = mI + c, (1)
where m is the consumer reduction rate (unit: kWh/$), and
c is a constant. We assume m ≥ 0 and I ≥ 0. We also
assume that any reduction during a DR event require some
incentives, i.e., c = 0. Thus, we have:
r(I, x2, . . . , xn) = mI. (2)
Intuitively, consumer reduction rate m is the amount of de-
mand reduction that can be obtained using a unit of incen-
tive. It can also be thought of as dr
dI , the rate of reduction
per unit incentive. Our response model can also be seen as
an alternative and first step towards defining a more realis-
tic response model due to the absence of real response data.
In the sequel, we often use R instead of r(I, f1, . . . , fn) to
simplify notation.
4. DR TO REDUCE ENERGY CONSUMP-
TION
4.1 Without DR (Business As Usual)
Cost We define the cost to meet load demand L as∑
gi∈G Cgi(Lgi), where L =
∑
gi∈G Lgi .
Revenue Let Pret be the retail price (unit: $/kWh) paid
by the consumers, and L be the total load demanded by the
consumers. Thus, company revenue = PretL.
Profit We define company’s profit as its revenue minus
cost:
PretL−
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(Lgi) (3)
4.2 With DR
Let I be the incentives that the utility company gives to the
consumers, and R denotes the consumers’ demand reduction
in a particular DR event. Thus, the total demand in the
presence of the DR event is LDR = L−R.
4In practice, the incentives can be of form movie tickets,
bill rebates, redeemable vouchers, etc. For simplicity, we
quantify I with its monetary value (unit: $) – the cost of
the DR provider to provide the incentives.
Cost The cost of meeting the load demand LDR is∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
DR
gi ), where L
DR =
∑
gi∈G
LDRgi .
Revenue Company revenue = PretL
DR.
Profit Company’s profit = revenue - cost - incentives:
PretL
DR −
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
DR
gi )− I (4)
Gain We define the gain of a utility company from a DR
event as the difference between its profit with and without
the DR event, i.e., by substracting Eq. 3 from Eq. 4:
gain = PretL
DR −∑gi∈G Cgi(LDRgi )− I − PretL+∑
gi∈G Cgi(Lgi)
=
∑
gi∈G
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)
+ PretL
DR−
PretL− I
=
∑
gi∈G
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I.
(5)
If LDR ≤ L, then there are some generators that are unused
or do not run at their full capacity. Let us denote this set
of generators as Gred , i.e., the reduced generators. And,
we define the rest of the generators as Gbase = G \ Gred .
Formally:
• gi ∈ Gred , iff LDRgi < Lgi , and
• gi ∈ Gbase , iff LDRgi = Lgi .
For instance, when there is a demand reduction during a
DR event, then by definition, the most expensive generator
belongs to Gred . We can rewrite the gain computation in
Eq. 5 by separating the set of generators in Gbase and Gred
as:
gain =
∑
gi∈G
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I
=
∑
gi∈Gbase
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)
+∑
gi∈Gred
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I
=
∑
gi∈Gred
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I
(6)
Thus, the gain of a DR event depends on the (i) difference
in the total cost of meeting the load demand, (ii) reduction
in the revenue, and (iii) total incentives.
The next challenge is to determine the right incentives to
obtain positive gain (or benefit) from DR. Once we have
identified necessary conditions to obtain positive gain, we
aim to find the optimal incentives to maximize gain. To this
end, we divide the problem into two cases. First, where a
utility company has access to a single energy source. Second,
in a more general setting, where the utility company has
access to multiple energy sources.
4.3 Single Energy Source
In this section, we study more deeply the setting where a
utility company has access to only one energy source, i.e.,
|G| = 1. The energy source can be, for example, an energy
market. Let Pmkt be the unit cost to meet the load demand,
or the market price if the energy source is an energy market.
Then, we can rewrite the gain computation in Eq. 6:
gain =
∑
gi∈Gred
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I
= PmktL− PmktLDR − PretR− I
= PmktR− PretR− I
= (Pmkt − Pret)R− I.
(7)
Note that, when the energy source considered is indeed an
energy market, then the market price before and after DR
events might be different due to the changes in the demand.
In this case, however, we assume that demand reduction
R is much smaller compared to the overall demand in the
market. Thus, it does not influence the market price. Next,
without loss of generality, we assume that the energy source
is the market.
4.3.1 The lower bound of market price
By substituting R from Eq. 2 into Eq. 7, we obtain:
gain = (Pmkt − Pret)R− I
= (Pmkt − Pret)mI − I
=
(
(Pmkt − Pret)m− 1)I.
(8)
To have positive gain, (Pmkt −Pret)m−1 should be positive:
(Pmkt − Pret)m− 1 > 0
Pmkt >
1
m
+ Pret .
(9)
Recall that the consumer reduction rate, m (unit: kWh/$),
expresses the amount of energy a consumer willing to sacri-
fice for a unit of incentive during a DR event. In economics,
m is also known as consumer’s willingness to pay, that is, the
maximum amount of energy a consumer is willing to sacri-
fice from her normal consumption level for a unit incentive.
While 1
m
(unit: $/kWh) is consumer willingness to accept,
i.e., the minimum amount of incentive a consumer is willing
to accept for a unit of energy she sacrifices from her normal
consumption level during a DR event. Inequality in Eq. 9
states that DR can bring an advantage to utility companies
when the market price is greater than the retail price plus the
consumer willingness to accept. This offers a deeper insight
to the common belief that DR should be carried out when
Pmkt > Pret . The customer willingness to accept should be
taken into account as well, i.e., Pmkt >
1
m
+ Pret .
4.3.2 The lower bound of consumer reduction rate
From Eq. 9, we can also derive the lowest consumer reduc-
tion rate required to obtain positive gain:
m > 1
Pmkt−Pret . (10)
That is, the higher the difference between the market and
the retail price, the less sensitive the consumers that a com-
pany need in its portfolio for the DR event, i.e., having con-
sumers with low m works just fine. However, when there is
only a marginal difference between the market and the retail
price, then consumers that are highly sensitive to incentives
(or having high m) is needed.
4.3.3 The optimal incentives
When Eq. 9 or 10 is satisfied, setting larger I leads to higher
gain. However, large I also causes large R. Thus, when
R > L, it means that consumers give some energy back to
the grid (or producing energy, i.e., becoming prosumers).
Then, the (positive) gain is due to consumers’ energy price,
1
m
, is cheaper than Pmkt − Pret .
Demand reduction, however, is typically limited. This can
be, for example, because the grids accept only limited bidi-
rectional energy flow, or the consumers (distributed) energy
generation capacity are limited. Let Rmax denotes the con-
sumers’ maximum reduction, where R ≤ Rmax , i.e.,
R =

mI, if I ≤ Rmax
m
,
Rmax , if I > Rmax
m
.
(11)
In most cases, it is easier to estimate the base load Lmin , the
minimum amount of electricity that the consumers cannot
live without. Thus, one can estimate Rmax by computing
Rmax = L− Lmin .
Theorem 1. In case of single energy source, when con-
sumer reduction is bounded by Rmax and Eq. 9 or 10 is sat-
isfied, then the incentives that maximize company’s gain is:
Iopt = Rmax
m
.
Proof. Let gain(?) be the company’s gain using incen-
tives ?. Then, there are two cases:
Case 1. The company gives incentives I′ < Iopt . Let R′ =
mI′. We show that gain(I′) < gain(Iopt):
gain(I′) = (Pmkt − Pret)R′ − I′
= (Pmkt − Pret)mI′ − I′
<
(
(Pmkt − Pret)mI′ − I′
)Iopt
I′
= (Pmkt − Pret)mIopt − Iopt
= gain(Iopt).
Case 2. The company gives incentives I′ > Iopt . Since
I′ > Rmax
m
, then according to Eq. 11, the demand reduction
R′ = Rmax . We show that gain(I′) < gain(Iopt):
gain(I′) = (Pmkt − Pret)R′ − I′
= (Pmkt − Pret)Rmax − I′
< (Pmkt − Pret)Rmax − Iopt
= (Pmkt − Pret)mIopt − Iopt
= gain(Iopt).
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Figure 1: Company’s gain for different incentives, where Pret =
0.2$/kWh, Pmkt = 1$/kWh, m = 2kWh/$, and Rmax = 800kWh.
The optimal incentive is 400$, while the highest incentives such
that the company still experiences positive gain is 640$.
4.3.4 The upper bound of incentives
To obtain the highest incentive which still gives us positive
gain, we require the gain to be positive while considering the
maximum reduction Rmax . That is, we replace R in Eq. 8
with Rmax :
(Pmkt − Pret)Rmax − I > 0
(Pmkt − Pret)Rmax > I. (12)
The maximum incentives a utility company can give to con-
sumers in order to have positive gain from DR should be
smaller than the difference between the market price and
the retail price times the maximum reduction Rmax .
Example 1. While typically the market price is lower
than the retail price, we consider in this example a period
where the market price is higher than the retail price. Let
the market price Pmkt = 1$/kWh, the retail price Pret =
0.2$/kWh, and m = 2kWh/$. Thus, inequalities in Eq. 9
and 10 are met. Suppose that the total load demand is
1000kWh and Lmin = 200kWh. Then, we have Rmax =
1000 − 200 = 800kWh. Figure 1 illustrates company’s gain
for different amount of incentives given to the customers.
Maximum gain is obtained where incentives is equal to Iopt =
Rmax/m = 400$. And, the upper bound of the incentives
such that the company still experiences positive gain is (Pmkt−
Pret)Rmax = 640$.
4.4 Multiple Energy Sources
In this section, we discuss the case of utility companies who
have access to multiple energy sources.5 Let us define Rgi
as the demand reduction for generator gi, that is, Rgi =
Lgi−LDRgi , and Ii = Rgi/m. Recall that, using the definition
of Gred and Gbase , we can rewrite the demand reduction as
R =
∑
gi∈GRgi =
∑
gi∈Gred Rgi . Similarly, we can also
rewrite the incentives as:
R =
∑
gi∈Gred Rgi
mI = ∑gi∈Gred (mIi)
I = ∑gi∈Gred Ii.
(13)
5Note that, an energy market can also be seen as one of
them.
Next, suppose that the unit cost to meet load demand us-
ing generator gi is Pgi , that is, Cgi(Lgi) = PgiLgi . This
assumption makes the cost function linear. However, some-
times we also would like to express the cost function as a step
function. In this case, we can formulate the step function
by considering each step as a distinct generator. Addition-
ally, some studies also consider quadratic cost function[29,
17, 31]. Since a quadratic function can be approximated
by a step function, our formulation above also allows us to
approximate the quadratic cost function as well. Then, the
gain computation in Eq. 6 can be rewritten as:
gain =
∑
gi∈Gred
(
Cgi(Lgi)− Cgi(LDRgi )
)− PretR− I
=
∑
gi∈Gred
(
PgiLgi − PgiLDRgi
)− PretR− I
=
∑
gi∈Gred (PgiRgi)− PretR− I
=
∑
gi∈Gred
(PgiRgi)−
∑
gi∈Gred
(PretRgi)−
∑
gi∈Gred
Ii
=
∑
gi∈Gred
(
(Pgi − Pret)Rgi − Ii
)
(14)
Further, we denote gaini = (Pgi − Pret)Rgi − Ii as the gain
contributed by generator gi.
4.4.1 Meaningful DR events
We define meaningful demand reduction as reduction which
yield positive gain, whereas demand reduction which yield
zero or negative gain, is meaningless. Additionally, a DR
event is meaningful if and only if demand reduction of each
generator is meaningful.6 This also implies that every de-
mand reduction to each generator, or incentives given to
customers should eventually increase company’s gain:
∀gi ∈ Gred , gaini > 0,
(Pgi − Pret)Rgi − Ii > 0,
(Pgi − Pret)mIi − Ii > 0,(
(Pgi − Pret)m− 1
)Ii > 0.
(15)
To have positive gain,
(
(Pgi−Pret)m−1
)
should be positive:
∀gi ∈ Gred , (Pgi − Pret)m− 1 > 0,
∀gi ∈ Gred , Pgi > 1m + Pret , or m > 1Pgi−Pret .
(16)
4.4.2 The optimal incentives
Providing that the inequalities in Eq. 16 are satisfied, we
can derive the optimal incentive.
Lemma 2. In case of utility companies with multiple en-
ergy sources, if demand reduction R is unbounded and Eq. 16
is satisfied, then higher incentives I leads to higher demand
reduction R, and eventually higher gain.
6Note that, we could also define meaningful DR events in a
weaker sense, i.e., if only if the event yield a positive gain.
If we define it that way, it means that there could be a
set of generators G+red where gaini > 0 for all gi ∈ G+red
and a set of generators G−red where gaini ≤ 0 for all gi ∈
G−red . Since our goal is maximizing the gain, then there is
no point in considering (reducing the load of) G−red . This is
the reason we define meaningful DR events in its stronger
sense, considering only G+red .
Proof. Let gain(I) be the gain using incentives I and
gaini(Ii) be the gain contributed by generator gi using in-
centives Ii. Therefore, we have gain(I) = ∑gi∈Gred gaini(Ii)
(see Eq. 14).
We need to show that whenever I > I′, then gain(I) >
gain(I′). We assume that whether the company gives I or
I′, Eq. 16 is satisfied. Let R = mI and R′ = mI′ be the
demand reduction and Gred and G
′
red be the set of reduced
generators when the utility company gives incentives I and
I′, respectively. Because R > R′, then Gred ⊇ G′red . Then,
there are two cases:
Case 1. Gred = G′red . This means that we have the same
amount of reduction in every generators, in Gred and G
′
red ,
up to their capacity, except for the cheapest one (since R >
R′).
Let gω be the cheapest generator in Gred (and in G
′
red).
Then, ∀gi ∈ Gred \ gω, we have Rgi = R′gi = cap(gi). Con-
sequently, since R > R′, then Rgω > R
′
gω .
Let Ii = Rgi/m and I′i = R′gi/m. Then, we have Iω > I′ω
and gaingω (Iω) > gaingω (I′ω). Thus:
gain(I) = ∑gi∈Gred\gω gaini(Ii) + gaingω (Iω)
>
∑
gi∈Gred\gω gaini(Ii) + gaingω (I
′
ω)
=
∑
gi∈G′red\gω
gaini(I′i) + gaingω (I′ω)
= gain(I′)
Case 2. Gred ⊃ G′red . Since the inequalities in Eq. 16 is
satisfied, ∀gi ∈ Gred \G′red , we have gaini(I′) > 0. Thus:
gain(I) = ∑gi∈Gred gaini(Ii)
=
∑
gi∈G′red
gaini(Ii) +
∑
gi∈Gred\G′red
gaini(Ii)
>
∑
gi∈G′red
gaini(Ii)
= gain(I′)
Similar to the case of the single energy source, however,
consumer demand reduction is typically not unbounded. Let
Rmax denote the upper bound of the reduction. Then, Rmax
upper bounding consumer demand reduction as described in
Eq. 11.
Theorem 3. When demand reduction is bounded by Rmax
and Eq. 16 is satisfied, then the optimal incentives that max-
imize company’s gain is: Iopt = Rmax/m.
Proof. Let gain(I) denotes the gain by giving incentives
I. We show that when the utility company gives incentives
I′ 6= Iopt , then gain(I′) < gain(Iopt).
Let R′ = mI′ and Ropt = mIopt be the demand reduction
and G′red and Gred be the set of reduced generators when the
utility company gives incentives I′ and Iopt , respectively.
Then, there are two cases:
Case 1. The company gives incentives Iopt > I′. We need
to show that gain(Iopt) > gain(I′). Note that, in this case,
we have R > R′, which also implies Gred ⊇ G′red . Then, we
proceed as in the proof of Lemma 2, Case 1 and Case 2, by
substituting I with Iopt and R with Ropt .
Case 2. The company gives incentives Iopt < I′. We need
show that gain(Iopt) > gain(I′). From Eq. 11, we have
R′ = Ropt = Rmax . This also implies that G′red = Gred .
gain(I′) = ∑gi∈G′red (Pgi − Pret)R′ − I′
=
∑
gi∈G′red
(Pgi − Pret)Rmax − I′
<
∑
gi∈G′red
(Pgi − Pret)Rmax − Iopt
=
∑
gi∈Gred (Pgi − Pret)Rmax − Iopt
= gain(Iopt).
4.4.3 The upper bound of incentives
When the demand reduction is maximum, i.e., Rmax = L−
LDR, we denote Rmaxgi = Lgi − LDRgi as the demand re-
duction for generator gi. Consequently, we have Rmax =∑
gi∈Gred R
max
gi . Then, by replacing Rgi in Eq. 14 with R
max
gi ,
we derive the highest incentive a company can provide while
still maintaining positive gain:∑
gi∈Gred
[
(Pgi − Pret)Rmaxgi − Ii
]
> 0∑
gi∈Gred
[
(Pgi − Pret)Rmaxgi
]− I > 0∑
gi∈Gred (Pgi − Pret)R
max
gi > I.
(17)
Example 2. Suppose that a utility company has access
to two different energy sources, g1 and g2, where cap(g1) =
5000kW and cap(g2) = 2000kW . Assume that for a specific
time period, we have load demand L = 6500kWh, Pg1 =
0.1$/kWh (base generator), and Pg2 = 1$/kWh (peak gen-
erator). Additionally, let Pret = 0.2$/kWh, m = 2kWh/$,
and Rmax = 1200kWh. Figure 2 shows company’s gain for
different amount of incentives given to the customers. Max-
imum gain is obtained when incentives is equal to Iopt =
Rmax/m = 600$. The highest incentives such that the com-
pany still experiences positive gain is (Pg2 − Pret)Rmaxg2 =
(1− 0.2) · 1200 = 960$.7
5. DRTO INCREASEENERGYCONSUMP-
TION
In the previous section, we have discussed about DR for
energy reduction. However, DR could also be used to in-
centivize consumers to increase their energy consumption,
especially when there is a surplus energy and balancing the
surplus is costly. This can be, for example, when (the output
of) some generators cannot be turned off (or reduced) easily
without additional cost. Or, when the demand is surpris-
ingly low, while we have bought much more energy in the
7Note that, to compute Rmaxg2 , we need to first compute L
DR
as if the reduction is Rmax . Thus, L
DR = L − Rmax =
5300kWh. Using the load generation assumption in Sec-
tion 3.1, we have Lg1 = 5000kWh, Lg2 = 1500kWh,
LDRg1 = 5000kWh, and L
DR
g2 = 300kWh. Therefore, we have
Rmaxg1 = 0kWh and R
max
g2 = 1200kWh.
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Figure 2: Company’s gain for different incentives where the com-
pany has two energy sources, g1 and g2, with cap(g1) = 500kW ,
cap(g2) = 5000kW . For this time period, we have L = 2000kWh,
Pg1 = 0.1$/kWh, Pg2 = 1$/kWh, Pret = 0.2$/kWh, m =
2kWh/$, and Rmax = 1200kWh. The optimal incentive is 600$,
while the highest incentive such that company still experiences
positive gain is 960$.
day-ahead market. If the grid operator balances the surplus,
then we need to pay the penalty for the imbalances.
Together with its ability to reduce demand, DR’s ability to
increase demand form a framework for load shaping strat-
egy. In this section, we discuss the economics of pervasive,
incentive-based DR, when it is used as a mechanism to en-
courage demand increase. We present only the case where
utility companies have access to multiple energy sources,
since the case of single energy source can be regarded as a
special case of that.
Let L+ be the total energy produced in the surplus/abundance
period, where L+ > L, and Smax = L
+ − L be the excess
energy. Additionally, let L+gi be the energy produced by gen-
erator gi. We define CB(Smax ) as the balancing cost, e.g.,
the cost to balance the grid due to the excess energy (this
task is generally performed in a balancing market). Note
that, in Section 4, the role of the balancing market to gener-
ate additional electricity when the supply is short can also be
thought as one of (typically more expensive) energy sources.
5.1 Without DR (Business As Usual)
Cost We define company’s total cost as the sum of gener-
ation and balancing cost:
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi) + CB(Smax ).
Revenue Company’s revenue: PretL.
Profit Company’s profit = revenue - cost:
PretL−
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi)− CB(Smax ). (18)
5.2 With DR
Note that, in this case, there is a surplus of energy, Smax ,
which is ready to be consumed. Encouraging consumers to
consume this surplus energy not only results in increasing
company’s revenue (because consumers’ bill increases), but
also acts as an energy balancing mechanisms, when there is
a shortage of energy in the future. That is, it is potentially
easier for the people to consume less energy in the future,
when the supply is short, when some activities has been
done or shifted to the previous (energy abundance) period.
Therefore, we would like to use DR to incentivize consumers
to increase their consumption during this surplus period.
Let us assume that the consumers increase their demand
from L to L + S, where 0 ≤ S ≤ Smax .
Cost Compared to the previous case (without DR), com-
pany’s cost is lower due to the decrease in the balancing
cost:
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi) + CB(Smax − S).
Revenue Company’s revenue increases due to the increase
in consumers’ demand: Pret(L + S).
Profit Company’s profit = revenue - cost - incentive:
Pret(L + S)−
∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi)− CB(Smax − S)− I. (19)
Gain We define the gain of a utility company during a DR
event in this abundance period as the difference between its
profit with and without the DR event, i.e., Eq. 19 - Eq 18:
gain = Pret(L + S)− ∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi)− CB(Smax − S)−
I − PretL + ∑
gi∈G
Cgi(L
+
gi) + CB(Smax )
= PretS − I − CB(Smax − S) + CB(Smax )
(20)
As in the case of the generation cost (see Section 4.4), let us
assume that the balancing cost has a unit cost PB . Then,
we have:
gain = PretS − I + PB(Smax − S) + PB · Smax
= PretS − I + PBS
= (Pret + PB)S − I
(21)
Similar to the case of DR to reduce energy consumption, we
assume that consumer response grows linearly with the in-
centives offered, i.e., S = m+ · I, where m+ is the consumer
increase rate (unit: kWh/$). The higher the consumer in-
crease rate, the more sensitive she is to incentives.8 Since S
is bounded by Smax , consequently,
S =

m+ · I, if I ≤ Smax
m+
Smax , if I > Smax
m+
.
(22)
5.2.1 The lower bound of consumer increase rate
To have positive gain:
(Pret + PB)S − I > 0
(Pret + PB)m
+ · I − I > 0(
(Pret + PB)m
+ − 1)I > 0 (23)
8In practice, consumers can increase their demand by shift-
ing their later activities to the DR event period. If they
do not have any activities to be shifted, however, rational
consumers would have 1/m+ > Pret , i.e., they respond (or
increase their demand) iff the incentive per unit energy is
greater than the retail price.
Thus, (Pret + PB)m
+ − 1 should be positive:
(Pret + PB)m
+ − 1 > 0
m+ > 1
Pret+PB
,
(24)
If we assume that Pret is fixed, then the sensitivity of the con-
sumers required for a DR event is inversely related with the
balancing prices. While highly sensitive consumers are gen-
erally preferred for DR, however when the balancing price
is high, having less sensitive consumers (consumers with low
m+) are also fine.
5.2.2 The lower bound of the balancing price
Using Eq. 24, we can also derive the lower bound of the
balancing price:
PB >
1
m+
− Pret (25)
5.2.3 The optimal incentives
When Eq. 24 or 25 is satisfied, we can derive the optimal
incentives that maximize company’s gain.
Theorem 4. In the case of DR to increase energy con-
sumption, given that Eq. 24 or 25 is satisfied, the optimal in-
centives that maximize company’s gain is: Iopt = Smax/m+.
Proof. Let gain(I) denotes company’s gain by providing
incentives I. If Eq. 24 or 25 is satisfied, then for I′ 6= Iopt ,
we show that gain(I′) < gain(Iopt). Let S′ = m+ ·I′ be the
increase in energy consumption due to incentive I′. Then,
there are two cases:
Case 1. I′ < Iopt
gain(I′) = (Pret + PB)S′ − I′
= (Pret + PB)m
+ · I′ − I′
<
(
(Pret + PB)m
+ · I′ − I′)IoptI′
= (Pret + PB)m
+ · Iopt − Iopt
= gain(Iopt).
Case 2. I′ > Iopt . Since I′ > Smax/m+, we have S′ =
Smax (see Eq. 22). Then,
gain(I′) = (Pret + PB)S′ − I′
= (Pret + PB)Smax − I′
< (Pmkt + PB)Smax − Iopt
= (Pmkt + PB)m
+ · Iopt − Iopt
= gain(Iopt).
5.2.4 The upper bound of incentives
The highest incentives that a utility company can give to
consumers while still experiences positive gain can be ob-
tained by assuming the maximum consumption increase:
(Pret + PB)Smax − I > 0
(Pret + PB)Smax > I,
(26)
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Figure 3: Increase in energy consumption and gain for differ-
ent incentives given to consumers in the case of DR to increase
energy consumption, where L = 1000kWh, L+ = 1500kWh,
Pret = 0.2$/kWh, PB = 1$/kWh, and m
+ = 1kWh/$. The
optimal incentive is 500$, while the highest incentive such that
the company still experiences positive gain is 600$.
Example 3. Let us consider a case where the load de-
mand L = 1000kWh and the total energy generated in the
abundance period L+ = 1500kWh. In addition, let us as-
sume that Pret = 0.2$/kWh, PB = 1$/kWh, and m
+ =
1kWh/$. Figure 3 shows company’s gain for different amount
of incentives provided to consumers. Note that, we have
Smax = 1500kWh − 1000kWh = 500kWh. Maximum gain is
obtained when the incentive is equal to Iopt = Smax/m+ =
500$. The highest incentives such that the company still ex-
periences positive gain is given by (Pret + PB)Smax = 600$.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we identified the necessary conditions to ben-
efit from pervasive DR. These conditions include: the lower
bound of consumer reduction/increase rate, the lower bound
of generation cost (including market price), the lower bound
of balancing price, and the upper bound of incentives. Fur-
thermore, we determine the optimal incentives to maximize
gain. To derive these results, we presented a number of
simplifying assumptions, such as the linearity of consumer
response on the incentives, and perfectly known maximum
reduction/increase that should be relaxed in the future.
Understanding consumer reduction/increase rate is of ut-
most important, since it is a key to successful DR programs.
Therefore, when exploratory DR events are needed to bet-
ter understand and learn consumer responses, our results
can serve as the boundary to guarantee positive gain. In
addition, we believe there are numerous other factors that
could influence consumer responses in real world, such as
time of the day, day of the week, weather, outdoor tem-
perature, holidays, or guests at home. We also have not
considered consumer fatigue; for some consumers, receiving
too many DR signals could be annoying, and consequently,
deter their participation in the next DR events. Thus, the
availability of real data from real deployment in the future
could be used to validate and refine our results.
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